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The scientific community is becoming more and more interested in the research that
applies themathematical formalism of quantum theory tomodel human decision-making.
In this paper, we expose the theoretical foundations of the quantum approach to
cognition that we developed in Brussels. These foundations rest on the results of two
decade studies on the axiomatic and operational-realistic approaches to the foundations
of quantum physics. The deep analogies between the foundations of physics and those
of cognition lead us to investigate the validity of quantum theory as a general and
unitary framework for cognitive phenomena, and the empirical success of the Hilbert
space models derived by such investigation provides a strong theoretical confirmation
of this validity. However, two situations in the cognitive realm, “question order effects”
and “response replicability,” indicate that even the Hilbert space framework could be
insufficient to reproduce the expected pattern. This does not mean that the mentioned
operational-realistic approach would be incorrect, but simply that a larger class of
measurements would be in force in human cognition, so that an extended quantum
formalism may be needed to deal with all of them. As we will explain, the recently
derived “extended Bloch representation” of quantum theory (and the associated “general
tension-reduction” model) precisely provides such extended formalism, while remaining
within the same unitary interpretative framework.
Keywords: human cognition, cognitive modeling, quantum structures, foundations of quantum theory,
tension-reduction model
1. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental problem in cognition concerns the identification of the principles guiding human
decision-making. Identifying the mechanisms of decision-making would indeed have manifold
implications, from psychology to economics, finance, politics, philosophy, and computer science.
In this regard, the predominant theoretical paradigm rests on a classical conception of logic and
probability theory. According to this paradigm, people take decisions by following the rules of
Boole’s logic, while the probabilistic aspects of these decisions can be formalized by Kolmogorov’s
probability theory [1]. However, increasing experimental evidence on conceptual categorization,
probability judgments, and behavioral economics confirms that this classical conception is
fundamentally problematical, in the sense that the cognitive models based on these mathematical
structures are not capable of capturing how people concretely take decisions in situations of
uncertainty.
Aerts et al. The Brussels Approach to Cognition
In the last decade, an alternative scientific paradigm has
caught on which applies a different modeling scheme. The
research that uses the mathematical formalism of quantum
theory to model situations and processes in cognitive science is
becoming more and more accepted in the scientific community,
having attracted the interest of renowned scientists, funding
institutions, media, and popular science. And, quantum models
of cognition showed to be more effective than traditional
modeling schemes to describe situations like the “Guppy
effect,” the “combination problem,” the “prisoner’s dilemma,” the
“conjunction and disjunction fallacies,” “similarity judgments,”
the “disjunction effect,” “violations of the Sure-Thing principle,”
“Allais,” “Ellsberg,” and “Machina paradoxes” (see, e.g., [2–22]).
Recently, quantum computational semantics were applied to
natural and musical languages in a novel approach [23, 24].
There is a general acceptance that the use of the term
“quantum” is not directly related to physics, neither this research
in “quantum cognition” aims to unveil the microscopic processes
occurring in the human brain. The term “quantum” rather refers
to the mathematical structures that are applied to cognitive
domains. The scientific community engaged in this research
does not instead have a shared opinion on how and why these
quantummathematical structures should be employed in human
cognition. Different hypotheses have been put forward in this
respect. Our research team in Brussels has been working in this
domain since early nineties, providing pioneering and substantial
contributions to its growth, and we think it is important to expose
the epistemological foundations of the quantum theoretical
approach to cognition we developed in these years. This is the
main aim of the present paper.
Our approach was inspired by a two decade research on
the mathematical and conceptual foundations of quantum
physics, quantum probability, and the fundamental differences
between classical and quantum structures [25–28]. We followed
an axiomatic and operational-realistic approach to quantum
physics, in which we investigated how the mathematical
formalism of quantum theory in Hilbert space can be derived
from more intuitive and physically justified axioms, directly
connected with empirical situations and facts. This led us
to elaborate a “State Context Property” (SCoP) formalism,
according to which any physical entity is expressed in terms of
the operationally well defined notions of “state,” “context,” and
“property,” and functional relations between these notions [29].
If suitable axioms are imposed to such a SCoP structure, then
one obtains a mathematical representation that is isomorphic to
a Hilbert space over complex numbers (see, e.g., [30]).
Let us shortly explain the “operational-realistic” connotation
characterizing our approach, because doing so we can easily
point out its specific strength, and the reason why it introduces
an essentially new element to the domain of psychology.
“Operational” stands for the fact that all fundamental elements
in the formalism are directly linked to the measurement
settings and operations that are performed in the laboratory
of experimentation. “Realistic” means that we introduce in an
operational way the notion of “state of an entity,” considering
such a “state” as representing an aspect of the reality of the
considered entity at a specific moment or during a specific
time-span. Historically, the notion of “state of a physical entity”
was the “easy” part of the physical theories that were the
predecessors of quantum theory, and it was the birth of quantum
theory that forced physicists to take also seriously the role of
measurement and hence the value of an operational approach.
The reason is that “the reality of a physical entity” was considered
to be a simple and straightforward notion in classical physics and
hence the “different modes of reality of a same physical entity”
were described by its “different states.” That measurements
would intrinsically play a role, also in the description of the reality
of a physical entity, only became clear in quantum physics for the
case of micro-physical entities.
In psychology, things historically evolved in a different way.
Here, one is in fact confronted with what we call “conceptual
entities,” such as “concepts” or “conceptual combinations,” and
more generally with any cognitive situation which is presented
to the different participants in a psychology experiment. Due
to their nature, conceptual entities and cognitive situations are
“much less real than physical entities,” which makes the notion
of “state of a conceptual entity” a highly non-obvious one in
psychology. And, as far as we know, the notion of state is
never explicitly introduced in psychology, although it appears
implicitly within the reasoning that is made about experiments,
their setups and results. Possibly, the notion of “preparation
of the experiment” will be used for what we call “the state
of the considered conceptual entity” in our approach. Often,
however, the notion of state is also associated with the “belief
system” of the participant in the experiment. In our approach
we keep both notions of “state” and “measurement” on equal
footing, whether our description concerns a physical entity or
a conceptual entity. In this way, we can make optimal use of
the characteristic methodological strengths of each one of the
notions. It is in doing so that we observed that there is an
impressive analogy between the operational-realistic description
of a physical entity and the operational-realistic description
of a conceptual entity, in particular for what concerns the
measurement process and the effects of context on the state of
the entity. As a matter of fact, one can give a SCoP description
of a conceptual entity and its dynamics [4, 8, 9]. This justifies
the investigation of quantum theory as a unified, coherent and
general framework to model conceptual entities, as quantum
theory is a natural candidate tomodel context effects and context-
induced state transformations. Hence, the quantum theoretical
models that we worked out for specific cognitive situations
strictly derive from such investigation of quantum theory as
a scientific paradigm for human cognition. In this respect, we
think that each predictive success of quantum modeling can
be considered as a confirmation of such general validity. It is
however important to observe that, recently, potential deviations
from Hilbert space modeling were discovered in two cognitive
situations, namely, “question order effects” [31] and “response
replicability” [32]. According to some authors, question order
effects can be represented by sequential quantum measurements
of incompatible properties [14, 18, 31]. However, such a
representation seems to be problematical, as it cannot reproduce
the pattern that would be observed in response replicability,
in case the effect were confirmed experimentally [32], nor it
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can fit the experimental data, when non-degenerate models are
considered [33, 34], or “exactly” fit the data, when degenerate
models are used, as for instance the quantum identity called the
QQ-equality (see Section 5) is never “perfectly” obeyed by the
data (although it is remarkably almost obeyed by measurements
not including background information [14, 18, 31]).
We put forward an alternative solution for these effects within
a “hidden measurement formalism” elaborated by ourselves (see,
e.g., [26, 35–39] and references therein), which goes beyond
the Hilbert space formulation of quantum theory (probabilities),
though it remains compatible with our operational-realistic
description of conceptual entities [34, 40].
For the sake of completeness, we summarize the content of
this paper in the following.
In Section 2, we present the epistemological foundations
of the quantum theoretical approach to human cognition we
developed in Brussels. We operationally describe a conceptual
entity in terms of concrete experiments that are performed
in psychological laboratories. Specifically, the conceptual entity
is the reality of the situation which every participant in an
experiment is confronted with, and the different states of this
conceptual entity are the different modes of reality of this
experimental situation. There are contexts influencing the reality
of this experimental situation, and the relevant ones of these
contexts are elements of the SCoP structure, the theory of our
approach, and their influence on the experimental situation is
described as a change of state of the conceptual entity under
consideration. There are also properties of this experimental
situation, the relevant ones being elements of the SCoP structure,
and they can be actual or potential, their “amount of actuality”
(i.e., their “degree of availability in being actualized”) being
described by a probability measure. The operational analogies
between physical and conceptual entities suggest to represent
the latter by means of the mathematical formalism of quantum
theory in Hilbert space. Hence, we assume, in our research,
the validity of quantum theory as a scientific paradigm for
human cognition. On the basis of this assumption, we provide a
unified presentation in Section 3 of the results obtained within
a quantum theoretical modeling in knowledge representation,
decision theory under uncertainty and behavioral economics.
We emphasize that our research allowed us to identify new
unexpected deviations from classical structures [41–43], as well
as new genuine quantum structures in conceptual combinations
[44–46], which could not have been identified at the same
fundamental level as it was possible in our approach if we would
have adopted themore traditional perspective only inquiring into
the observed deviations from classical probabilistic structures.
In Section 4, we analyze question order effects and response
replicability and explain why a quantum theoretical modeling
in Hilbert space of these situations is problematical. Finally, we
present in Section 5 a novel solution we recently elaborated
for these cognitive situations [34, 40]. The solution predicts
a violation of the Hilbert space formalism, more specifically,
the Born rule for probabilities is put at stake. We however
emphasize that this solution remains compatible with the general
operational and realistic description of cognitive entities and
their dynamics given in Section 2. In Section 6, we conclude our
article by offering a few additional remarks, further emphasizing
the coherence and advantage of our theoretical approach. We
stress, to conclude this section, that the deviation above from
Hilbert space modeling should not be considered as an indication
that we should better come back to more traditional classical
approaches. On the contrary, we believe that new mathematical
structures, more general than both pure classical and pure
quantum structures, will be needed in the modeling of cognitive
processes.
2. AN OPERATIONAL-REALISTIC
FOUNDATION OF COGNITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY
Many quantum physicists agree that the phenomenology of
microscopic particles is intriguing, but what is equally curious is
the quantummathematics that captures the mysterious quantum
phenomena. Since the early days of quantum theory, indeed,
scholars have been amazed by the success of the mathematical
formalism of quantum theory, as it was not clear at all how
it had come about. This has inspired a long-standing research
on the foundations of the Hilbert space formalism of quantum
theory from physically justified axioms, resting on well defined
empirical notions, more directly connected with the operations
that are usually performed in a laboratory. Such an operational
justification would make the formalism of quantum theory more
firmly founded.
One of the well-known approaches to the foundations of
quantum physics and quantum probability is the “Geneva-
Brussels approach”, initiated by Jauch [47] and Piron [48], and
further developed by our Brussels research team (see, e.g., [25,
28]). This research produced a formal approach, called “State
Context Property” (SCoP) formalism, where any physical entity
can be expressed in terms of the basic notions of “state,” “context,”
and “property,” which arise as a consequence of concrete physical
operations on macroscopic apparatuses, such as preparation and
registration devices, performed in spatio-temporal domains, such
as physical laboratories. Measurements, state transformations,
outcomes of measurements, and probabilities can then be
expressed in terms of these more fundamental notions. If suitable
axioms are imposed on the mathematical structures underlying
the SCoP formalism, then the Hilbert space structure of quantum
theory emerges as a unique mathematical representation, up to
isomorphisms [30].
There are still difficulties connected with the interpretation
of some of these axioms and their physical justification, in
particular for what concerns compound physical entities [25].
But, this research line was a source of inspiration for the
operational approaches applying the quantum formalism outside
the microscopic domain of quantum physics [49, 50]. In
particular, as we already mentioned in Section 1, a very similar
realistic and operational representation of conceptual entities
can be given for the cognitive domain, in the sense that
the SCoP formalism can again be employed to formalize the
more abstract conceptual entities in terms of states, contexts,
properties, measurements, and probabilities of outcomes [4, 8, 9].
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Let us first consider the empirical phenomenology of cognitive
psychology. Like in physics, where laboratories define precise
spatio-temporal domains, we can introduce “psychological
laboratories” where cognitive experiments are performed. These
experiments are performed on situations that are specifically
“prepared” for the experiments, including experimental devices,
and, for example, structured questionnaires, human participants
that interact with the questionnaires in written answers, or
each other, e.g., an interviewer and an interviewed. Whenever
empirical data are collected from the responses of several
participants, a statistics of the obtained outcomes arises. Starting
from these empirical facts, we identify in our approach entities,
states, contexts, measurements, outcomes, and probabilities of
outcomes, as follows.
The complex of experimental procedures conceived by the
experimenter, the experimental design and setting and the
cognitive effect that one wants to analyze, define a conceptual
entity A, and are usually associated with a preparation procedure
of a state of A. Hence, like in physics, the preparation procedure
sets the initial state pA of the conceptual entity A under study.
Let us consider, for example, a questionnaire where a participant
is asked to rank on a 7-point scale the membership of a
list of items with respect to the concepts Fruits, Vegetables
and their conjunction Fruits and Vegetables. The questionnaire
defines the states pFruits, pVegetables, and pFruits and Vegetables of the
conceptual entities Fruits, Vegetables, and Fruits and Vegetables,
respectively. It is true that cognitive situations exist where the
preparation procedure of the state of a conceptual entity is hardly
controllable. Notwithstanding this, the state of the conceptual
entity, defined by means of such a preparation procedure, is a
“state of affairs.” It indeed expresses a “reality of the conceptual
entity,” in the sense that, once prepared in a given state,
such condition is independent of any measurement procedure,
and can be confronted with the different participants in an
experiment, leading to outcome data and their statistics, exactly
like in physics.
A context e is an element that can provoke a change of
state of the conceptual entity. For example, the concept Juicy
can function as a context for the conceptual entity Fruits
leading to Juicy Fruits, which can then be considered as a state
of the conceptual entity Fruits. A special context is the one
introduced by themeasurement itself. Indeed, when the cognitive
experiment starts, an interaction of a cognitive nature occurs
between the conceptual entity A under study and a participant
in the experiment, in which the state pA of the conceptual entity
A generally changes, being transformed to another state p. Also
this cognitive interaction is formalized by means of a context e.
For example, if the participant is asked to choose among a list
of items, say, Olive, Almond, Apple, etc., the most typical one
with respect to Fruits, and the answer is Apple, then the initial
state pFruits of the conceptual entity Fruits changes to pApple, i.e.,
the state describing the situation “the fruit is an apple,” as a
consequence of the contextual interaction with the participant.
The change of the state of a conceptual entity due to a context
may be either “deterministic,” hence in principle predictable
under the assumption that the state before the context acts is
known, or “intrinsically probabilistic,” in the sense that only the
probability µ(p, e, pA) that the state pA of A changes to the state
p is given. In the example above on typicality estimations, the
typicality of the item Apple for the concept Fruits is formalized
by means of the transition probability µ(pApple, e, pFruits), where
the context e is the context of the typicality measurement.
Like in physics, an important role is played by experiments
with only two outcomes, the so-called “yes-no experiments.”
Suppose that in an opinion poll a participant is asked to
answer the question: “Is Gore honest and trustworthy?” Only
two answers are possible: “yes” and “no.” Suppose that, for a
given participant, the answer is “yes.” Then, the state pHonesty
of the conceptual entity Honesty and Trustworthiness (which
we will denote by Honesty, for the sake of simplicity) changes
to a new state pGy, which is the state describing the situation
“Gore is honest.” Hence, we can distinguish a class of yes-no
measurements on conceptual entities, as we do in physics.
The third step is the mathematical representation. We have
seen that the Hilbert space formalism of quantum theory is
general enough to capture an operational description of any
entity in the micro-physical domain. Then, the strong analogies
between the realistic and operational descriptions of physical
and conceptual entities, in particular for what concerns the
measurement process, suggest us to apply the same Hilbert space
formalism when representing cognitive situations. Hence, each
conceptual entity A is associated with a Hilbert spaceH, and the
state pA of A is represented by a unit vector |A〉 ∈ H. A yes-
no measurement is represented by a spectral family {M,1−M},
where M denotes an orthogonal projection operator over the
Hilbert space H, and 1 denotes the identity operator over H.
The probability that the “yes” outcome is obtained in such a
yes-no measurement when the conceptual entity A is in the
state represented by |A〉 is then given by the Born rule µ(A) =
〈A|M|A〉. For example, M may represent an item x that can be
chosen in relation to a given concept A, so that its membership
weight is given by µ(A).
The Born rule obviously applies to measurement with more
than two outcomes too. For example, a typicality measurement
involving a list of n different items x1, . . . , xn with respect
to a concept A can be represented as a spectral measure
{M1, . . . ,Mn}, where
∑n
k=1Mk = 1 and MkMl = δklMk, such
that the typicalityµk(A) of the item xk with respect to the concept
A is again given by the Born rule µk(A) = 〈A|Mk|A〉.
An interesting aspect concerns the final state of a conceptual
entity A after a human judgment. As above, we can assume the
existence of a nonempty class of cognitive measurements that are
ideal first kindmeasurements in the standard quantum sense, i.e.,
that satisfy the “Lüders postulate.” For example, if the typicality
measurement of a list of items x1, . . . , xn with respect to a concept
A gave the outcome xk, then the final state of the conceptual
entity after the measurement is represented by the unit vector
|Ak〉 = Mk|A〉√〈A|Mk|A〉 . Thismeans that the weightsµk(A) given by the
Born rule can actually be interpreted as transition probabilities
µ(pk, e, pA), where e is the context producing the transitions
from the initial state pA of the conceptual entity A, represented
by the unit vector |A〉, to one of the n possible outcome states pk,
represented by the unit vectors |Ak〉.
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Thus, how can a Hilbert space model be actually constructed
for a cognitive situation? To answer this question let us consider
again a conceptual entity A, in the state pA, a cognitive
measurement on A described by means of a context e, and
suppose that the measurement has n distinct outcomes, x1, x2,
. . . , xn. A quantum theoretical model for this situation can be
constructed as follows. Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity,
that the measurement outcomes can be considered to be non-
degenerate—this is a special situation which does not hold for
a wide class of cognitive measurements, see Section 3. Then,
we associate A with a n-dimensional complex Hilbert space H,
and then consider an orthonormal base {|e1〉, |e2〉, . . . , |en〉} inH
(since H is isomorphic to the Hilbert space Cn, the orthonormal
base ofH can be the canonical base ofCn). Next, we represent the
cognitive measurement described by e by means of the spectral
family {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn}, whereMk = |ek〉〈ek|, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Finally, the probability that the measurement e on the conceptual
entity A in the state pA gives the outcome xk is given by µk(A) =
〈A|Mk|A〉 = 〈A|ek〉〈ek|A〉 = |〈ek|A〉|2.
What about the interpretation of the Hilbert space formalism
above? Two major points should now be reminded, namely:
(i) the states of conceptual entities describe the “modes of
being” of these conceptual entities;
(ii) in a cognitive experiment, a participant acts as a
(measurement) context for the conceptual entity, changing
its state.
This means that, as we mentioned already, the state pA of the
conceptual entity A is represented in the Hilbert space formalism
by the unit vector |A〉, the possible outcomes xk of the experiment
by the base vectors |ek〉, and the action of a participant (or
the overall action of the ensemble of participants) as the state
transformation |A〉 → |ek〉 induced by the orthogonal projection
operatorMk = |ek〉〈ek|, if the outcome xk is obtained, so that the
probability of occurrence of xk can also be written as µk(A) =
µ(|ek〉, e, |A〉), where e is the measurement context associated
with the spectral family {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn}.
It follows from (i) and (ii) that a state, hence a unit vector in
the Hilbert space representation of states, does not describe the
subjective beliefs of a person, or collection of persons, about a
conceptual entity. Such subjective beliefs are rather incorporated
in the cognitive interaction between the cognitive situation and
the human participants deciding on that cognitive situation.
In this respect, our operational quantum approach to human
cognition is also a realistic one, and thus it departs from other
approaches that apply the mathematical formalism of quantum
theory to model cognitive processes [12, 14, 17, 18, 31, 32]. Of
course, one could say that the difference between interpreting
the quantum state as a “state of belief” of a participant in
the experiment, or as a “state of a conceptual entity,” i.e.,
a “state of the situation which the participant is confronted
with during an experiment,” is only a question of philosophical
interpretation, but comes to the same when it concerns the
methodological development of the approach. Although this is
definitely partly true, we do not fully agree with it. Interpretation
and methodology are never completely separated. A certain
interpretation, hence giving rise to a specific view on the matter,
will give rise to other ideas of how to further develop the
approach, how to elaborate the method, etc., than another
interpretation, with another view, will do. We believe that an
operational-realistic approach, being balanced between attention
for idealist as well as realist philosophical interpretations, carries
in this sense a particular strength, precisely due to this balance.
A good example of this is how we were inspired to use the
superposition principle of quantum theory in our modeling of
concepts as conceptual entities. We represented the combination
of two concepts by a state that is the linear superposition
of the states describing the component concepts. This way of
representing combined conceptual entities captures the nature of
emergence, exactly like in physics. It would not be obvious to put
forward this description when state of beliefs are the focus of what
can be predicted.
We stress a third point that is important, in our opinion.
For most situations, we interpret the effect of the cognitive
context on a conceptual entity in a decision-making process as an
“actualization of pure potentiality.” Like in quantum physics, the
(measurement) context does not reveal pre-existing properties of
the entity but, rather, it makes actual properties that were only
potential in the initial state of the entity (unless the initial state
is already an eigenstate of the measurement in question, like in
physics) [4, 8, 9].
It follows from the previous discussion that our research
investigates the validity of quantum theory as a general, unitary
and coherent theory for human cognition. Our quantum
theoretical models, elaborated for specific cognitive situations
and data, derive from quantum theory as a consequence of the
assumptions about this general validity. As such, these models
are subject to the technical and epistemological constraints of
quantum theory. In other terms, our quantum modeling rests on
a “theory based approach,” and should be distinguished from an
“ad hoc modeling based approach,” only devised to fit data. In
this respect, one should be suspicious of models in which free
parameters are added on an “ad hoc” basis to fit the data more
closely in specific experimental situations. In our opinion, the
fact that our “theory derived model” reproduces different sets of
experimental data constitutes in itself a convincing argument to
support its advantage over traditional modeling approaches and
to extend its use to more complex cognitive situations (in that
respect, see also our final remarks in Section 6).
We present in Section 3 the results obtained in our
quantum theoretical approach in the light of the epistemological
perspective of this section.
3. ON THE MODELING EFFECTIVENESS
OF HILBERT SPACE
The quantum approach to cognition described in Section 2
produced concrete models in Hilbert space, which faithfully
matched different sets of experimental data collected to reveal
“decision-making errors” and “probability judgment errors.”
This allowed us to identify genuine quantum structures in the
cognitive realm. We present a reconstruction of the attained
results in the following.
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The first set of results concerns knowledge representation
and conceptual categorization and combination. James Hampton
collected data on how people rate membership of items with
respect to pairs of concepts and their combinations, conjunction
[51], disjunction [52], and negation [53]. By using the data in
Hampton [52], we reconstructed the typicality estimations of 24
items with respect to the concepts Fruits and Vegetables and their
disjunction Fruits or Vegetables. We showed that the concepts
Fruits and Vegetables interfere when they combine to form Fruits
or Vegetables, and the state of the latter can be represented by the
linear superposition of the states of the former. This behavior is
analogous to that of quantum particles interfering in the double-
slit experiment when both slits are open. The data are faithfully
represented in a 25-dimensional Hilbert space over complex
numbers [15, 16].
In the data collected on the membership estimations of items
with respect to pairs (A,B) of concepts and their conjunction
“A and B” and disjunction “A or B,” Hampton found systematic
violations of the rules of classical (fuzzy set) logic and probability
theory. For example, the membership weight of the item Mint
with respect to the conjunction Food and Plant is higher
than the membership weight of Mint with respect to both
Food and Plant (“overextension”). Similarly, the membership
weight of the item Ashtray with respect to the disjunction
Home Furnishing or Furniture is lower than the membership
weight of Ashtray with respect to both Home Furnishing and
Furniture (“underextension”). We showed that overextension
and underextension are natural expressions of “conceptual
emergence” [10, 16]. Namely, whenever a person estimates the
membership of an item x with respect to the pair (A,B) of
concepts and their combination C(A,B), two processes act in the
person’s mind. The first process is guided by “emergence,” that
is, the person estimates the membership of x with respect to the
new emergent concept C(A,B). The second process is guided by
“logic,” that is, the person separately estimates the membership
of x with respect to A and B and applies a probabilistic logical
calculus to estimate the membership of x with respect to C(A,B)
[54]. More important, the new concept C(A,B) emerges from
the concepts A and B, exactly as the linear superposition of
two quantum states emerges from the component states. A two-
sector Fock space faithfully models Hampton’s data, and was later
successfully applied to the modeling of more complex situations
involving concept combinations (see e.g., [54, 55]).
It is interesting to note that the size of deviation of classical
probabilistic rules due to overextension and underextension
generally depends on the item x and the specific combination
C(A,B) of the concepts A and B that are investigated. However,
we recently performed a more general experiment in which we
asked the participants to rank the membership of items with
respect to the concepts A, B, their negations “not A,” “not B,”
and the conjunctions “A and B,” “A and not B,” “not A and B,”
and “not A and not B.” We surprisingly found that the size of
deviation from classicality in this experiment does not depend on
either the item or the pair of concepts or the specific combination,
but shows to be a numerical constant. Even more surprisingly,
our two-sector Fock space model correctly predicts the value
of this constant, capturing in this way a deep non-classical
mechanism connected in a fundamental way with themechanism
of conceptual formation itself rather than only specifically with
the mechanism of conceptual combination [42, 43].
Different concepts entangle when they combine, where
“entanglement” is meant in the standard quantum sense. We
proved this feature of concepts in two experiments. In the first
experiment, we asked the participants to choose the best example
for the conceptual combination The Animal Acts in a list of
four examples, e.g., The Horse Growls, The Bear Whinnies, The
Horse Whinnies, and The Bear Growls. By suitably combining
exemplars of Animal and exemplars of Acts, we performed four
joint measurements on the combination The Animal Acts. The
expectation values violated the “Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt”
version of Bell inequalities [56, 57]. The violation was such that,
not only the state of The Animal Acts was entangled, but also
the four joint measurements were entangled, in the sense that
they could not be represented in the Hilbert space C4 as the
(tensor) product of a measurement performed on the concept
Animal and a measurement performed on the concept Acts
[44]. In the second experiment, performed on the conceptual
combination Two Different Wind Directions, we confirmed the
presence of quantum entanglement, but we were also able to
prove that the empirical violation of the marginal law in this type
of experiments is due to a bias of the participants in picking wind
directions. If this bias is removed, which is what we did in an
ensuing experiment on Two Different Space Directions, one can
show that people pick amongst different space directions exactly
as coincidence spin measurement apparatuses pick amongst
different spin directions of a compound system in the singlet spin
state. In other words, entanglement in concepts can be proved
from only the statistics of the correlations of joint measurements
on combined concepts, exactly as in quantum physics [45].
Since concepts exhibit genuine quantum features when they
combine pairwise, it is reasonable to expect that these features
should be reflected in the statistical behavior of the combination
of several identical concepts. Indeed, we detected quantum-type
indistinguishability in an experiment on the combination of
identical concepts, such as the combination 11 Animals. More
specifically, we found significant evidence of deviation from
the predictions of classical statistical theories, i.e., “Maxwell-
Boltzmann distribution.” This deviation has clear analogies with
the deviation of quantum mechanical from classical mechanical
statistics, due to indistinguishability of microscopic quantum
particles, that is, we found convincing evidence of the presence of
“Bose-Einstein distribution.” In the experiment, indeed, people
do not seem to distinguish two identical concepts in the
combination of N identical concepts, which is more evident in
more abstract than in more concrete concepts, as expected [46].
The second set of results concern “decision-making errors
under uncertainty.” In the “disjunction effect” people prefer
action x over action y if they know that an event A occurs, and
also if they know that A does not occur, but they prefer y over
x if they do not know whether A occurs or not. The disjunction
effect violates a fundamental principle of rational decision theory,
Savage’s “Sure-Thing principle” and, more generally, the total
probability rule of classical probability [58]. This preference of
sure over unsure choices violating the Sure-Thing principle was
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experimentally detected in the “two-stage gamble” and in the
“Hawaii problem” [59]. In the experiment on a gamble that can
be played twice, the majority of participants prefer to bet again
when they know they won in the first gamble, and also when they
know they lost in the first gamble, but they generally prefer not
to play when they do not know whether they won or lost. In
the Hawaii problem, most students decide to buy the vacation
package when they know they passed the exam, and also when
they know they did not pass the exam, but they generally decide
not to buy the vacation package when they do not know whether
they passed or not passed the exam. We recently showed that, in
both experimental situations, this “uncertainty aversion” can be
explained as an effect of underextension of the conceptual entities
A and “not A” with respect to the conceptual disjunction “A or
not A,” where the latter describes the situation of not knowing
which event, A or “not A,” will occur. The concepts A and “not
A” interfere in the disjunction “A or not A,” which determines
its underextension. A Hilbert space model in C3 allowed us to
reproduce the data in both experiments on the disjunction effect
[55].
Ellsberg’s thought experiments, much before the disjunction
effect, revealed that the Sure-Thing principle is violated in
concrete decision-making under uncertainty, as people generally
prefer known over unknown probabilities, instead of maximizing
their expected utilities. In the famous “Ellsberg three-color
example,” an urn contains 30 red balls and 60 balls that are
either yellow or black, in unknown proportion. One ball will
be drawn at random from the urn. The participant is firstly
asked to choose between betting on “red” and betting on “black.”
Then, the same participant is asked to choose between betting
on “red or yellow” and betting on “black or yellow.” In each
case, the “right” choice will be awarded with $100. As the events
“betting on red” and “betting on black or yellow” are associated
with known probabilities, while their counterparts are not, the
participants will prefer betting on the former than betting on the
latter, thus revealing what Ellsberg called “ambiguity aversion,”
and violating the Sure-Thing principle [60]. This pattern of
choice has been confirmed by several experiments in the last 30
years [61]. Recently, Machina identified in a couple of thought
experiments, the “50/51 example” and the “reflection example,”
a similar mechanism guiding human preferences in specific
ambiguous situations, namely, “information symmetry” [62, 63],
which was experimentally confirmed in L’Haridon and Placido
[64]. In our quantum theoretical approach, ambiguity aversion
and information symmetry are two possible cognitive contexts
influencing human preferences in uncertainty situations and
changing the states of the “Ellsberg and Machina conceptual
entities,” respectively. Hence, an ambiguity aversion context will
change the state of the Ellsberg conceptual entity in such a way
that “betting on red” and “betting on black or yellow” are finally
preferred. In other terms, the novel element of this approach is
that the initial state of the conceptual entity, in its Hilbert space
representation, can also change because of the pondering of the
participants in relation to certain choices, before being collapsed
into a given outcome. This opens the way to a generalization
of rational decision theory with quantum, rather than classical,
probabilities [65].
The results above provide a strong confirmation of the
quantum theoretical approach presented in Section 2, and we
expect that further evidence will be given in this direction in the
years to come. In the next section we instead intend to analyze
some situations where deviations from Hilbert space modeling
of human cognition apparently occur. We will see in Section 5
that these deviations are however compatible with the general
operational-realistic framework portrayed in Section 2.
4. DEVIATING FROM HILBERT SPACE
As mentioned in Section 2, if suitable axioms are imposed on
the SCoP formalism, the Hilbert space structure of quantum
theory can be shown to emerge uniquely, up to isomorphisms
[30]. However, we also know that certain experimental situations
can violate some of these axioms. This is the case for instance
when we consider entities formed by experimentally separated
sub-entities, a situation that cannot be described by the standard
quantum formalism [25].Similarly, one may expect that the
structural shortcomings of the standard quantum formalism can
also manifest in the ambit of psychological measurements, in
the form of data that may not be exactly modelable (or jointly
modelable) by means of the specific Hilbert space geometry
and the associated Born rule. The purpose of this section is
to describe two paradigmatic examples of situations of this
kind: “question order effects” and “response replicability.” In the
following section, we then show how the quantum formalism
can be naturally completed to also faithfully model these data,
in a way that remains consistent with our operational-realistic
approach.
Let us first remark that the mere situation of having to deal
with a set of data for which we do not yet have a faithful
Hilbert space model should not make one necessarily search
for an alternative more general quantum-like mathematical
structure as a modeling framework. Indeed, it is very well
possible that the adequate Hilbert space model has not yet been
found. Recently, however, a specific situation was identified and
analyzed indicating that the standard quantum formalism in
Hilbert space would not be able to be used to model it [32]. This
situation combines two phenomena: “question order effects” and
“response replicability.” We start by explaining “question order
effects” and how the cognitive situation in which they appear can
be represented in Hilbert space.
For this we come back to the yes-no experiment of Section 2,
where participants are asked: “Is Gore honest and trustworthy?”
This experiment gives rise to a two-outcome measurement
performed on the conceptual entity Honesty in the initial state
pH , represented by the unit vector |H〉 ∈ H, where H is a
two-dimensional Hilbert space if we assume the measurement to
be non-degenerate, or more generally a n-dimensional Hilbert
space if we also admit the possibility of sub-measurements.
Denoting {MG, M¯G = 1 − MG} the spectral family associated
with this measurement, the probability of the “yes” outcome
(i.e., to answer “yes” to the question about Gore’s honesty and
trustworthiness) is then given by the Born rule µGy(H) =
〈H|MG|H〉, and of course µGn(H) = 〈H|M¯G|H〉 = 1−µGy(H) is
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the probability for the “no” outcome. We then consider a second
measurement performed on the conceptual entity Honesty, but
this time associated with the question: “Is Clinton honest and
trustworthy?” We denote {MC, M¯C = 1 − MC} the spectral
family associated with this second measurement, so that the
probabilities for the “yes” and “no” outcomes are again given by
µCy(H) = 〈H|MC|H〉 and µCn(H) = 〈H|M¯C|H〉, respectively.
Starting from these two measurements, it is possible to
conceive sequential measurements, corresponding to situations
where the respondents are subject to the Gore and Clinton
questions in a succession, one after the other, in different orders.
Statistical data about “Clinton/Gore” sequential measurements
were reported in a seminal article on question order effects
[66] and further analyzed in Busemeyer and Bruza [14,
67]. More precisely, after fixing a rounding error in Wang
and Busemeyer [67], we have the following sequential (or
conditional) probabilities [34]:
µCyGy(H) = 0.4899 µCyGn(H) = 0.0447 µCnGy(H)
= 0.1767 µCnGn(H) = 0.2887 (1)
µGyCy(H) = 0.5625 µGyCn(H) = 0.1991 µGnCy(H)
= 0.0255 µGnCn(H) = 0.2129 (2)
where Equation (1) corresponds to the sequence where first the
Clinton and then theGoremeasurements are performed, whereas
Equation (2) corresponds to the reversed order sequence for the
measurements. Considering that the probabilities in each of the
four columns above are sensibly different, these data describe
typical “question order effects.”
Quantum theory is equipped with a very natural tool to
model question order effects: “incompatible measurements,” as
expressed by the fact that two self-adjoint operators, and the
associated spectral families, in general do not commute. More
precisely, the Hilbert space expression for the probability that,
say, we obtain the answer CyGn when we perform first the
Clinton measurement and then the Gore one, is [14, 67]:
µCyGn(H) = 〈H|MCM¯GMC|H〉. Similarly, the probability to
obtain the outcome GnCy, for the sequential measurement
in reversed order, is: µGnCy(H) = 〈H|M¯GMCM¯G|H〉. Since
we have the operatorial identity M¯GMCM¯G − MCM¯GMC =
(MG −MC)[MG,MC], the difference µGnCy(H)− µCyGn(H) will
generally be non-zero if [MG,MC] 6= 0, i.e., if the spectral
families associated with the two measurements do not commute.
In the following we will analyze whether non-compatibility
within a standard quantum approach can cope in a satisfying way
with these question order effects, and show that a simple “yes”
to this question is not possible. Indeed, a deep problem already
comes to the surface in relation to the phenomenon of “response
replicability.”
Consider again the Gore/Clinton measurements: if a
respondent says “yes” to the Gore question, then is asked the
Clinton question, then again is asked the Gore question, the
answer given to the latter is expected to be “yes,” independently
of the answer given to the intermediary Clinton question. This
conjectured phenomenon, still necessitating a clear experimental
confirmation, is called “response replicability1 .” If, in addition,
to question order effects also response replicability is jointly
modeled in Hilbert space quantum mechanics, a contradiction
can be detected, as shown in Khrennikov et al. [32]. Let us
indicate what are the elements that produce this contradiction.
In standard quantum mechanics only if a state is an eigenstate
of the considered measurement the outcome “yes” will be
certain in advance. Also, measurements that can transform an
arbitrary initial state into an eigenstate are ideal measurements
called of the first kind. According to response replicability,
outcomes that once have been obtained for a measurement will
have to become certain in advance if this same measurement
is performed a second time. This means that the associated
measurements should be ideal and of the first kind. For the
case of the Gore/Clinton measurements, and the situation of
response replicability mentioned above, this means that the
Gore measurement should be ideal and of the first kind. But
one can also consider the situation where first the Clinton
measurement is performed, then the Gore measurement and
afterwards the Clinton measurement again. A similar analysis
leads then to the Clinton measurement needing to be ideal
and of the first kind. This means however that after more
than three measurements that alternate between Clinton and
Gore, the state needs to have become an eigenstate of both
measurements. As a consequence, both measurements can
be shown to be represented by commuting operators. The
proof of the contradiction between “response replicability” and
“non-commutativity” worked out in Khrennikov et al. [32]
is formal and also more general than the intuitive reasoning
presented above—for example, the contradiction is also proven
when measurements are represented by positive-operator valued
measures instead of projection valued measures, which is what
we have considered here—and hence indicates that the non-
commutativity of the self-adjoint operators needed to account
for the question order effects cannot be realized together with
the “ideal and first kind” properties needed to account for the
response replicability within a standard quantum Hilbert space
setting.
Although refined experiments would be needed to reveal the
possible reasons for response replicability, it is worth to put
forward some intuitive ideas, as we have been developing a
quantum-like but more general than Hilbert space formalism
within our Brussels approach to quantum cognition [35–37], and
we believe that we can cope with the above contradiction within
this more general quantum-like setting in a very natural way. It
seems to be a plausible hypothesis that response replicability is,
at least partly, due to a multiplicity of effects, that however take
place during the experiment itself, such as desire of coherence,
learning, fear of being judged when changing opinion, etc. And
a crucial aspect for both question order effects and response
replicability appearing in the Gore/Clinton situation is that the
sequential measurements need to be carried out with the same
participant, who has to be tested again and again. This is different
1We stress here that such a conjecture does require that “all’ psychological
measurements should satisfy “response replicability.” It rather claims that the latter
should hold for a non-empty class of these measurements.
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than the situation in quantum physics, where order effects
appear for non-commuting observables also when sequential
measurements are performed with different apparatuses. Hence,
both question order effects and response replicability seem to
be the consequence of “changes taking place in the way each
subject responds probabilistically to the situation—described by
the state of the conceptual entity in our approach—he or she is
confronted with during a measurement.” Since the structure of
the probabilistic response to a specific state is fixed in quantum
mechanics, being determined by the Born rule, it is clear that such
a change of the probabilistic response to a given measurement,
when it is repeated in a sequence of measurements, cannot
be accounted for by the standard quantum formalism. And
it is exactly such structure of the probabilistic response to a
same measurement with respect to a given state that can be
varied in the generalized quantum-like theory that we have
been developing [35–37]. This is the reason that, when we
became aware of the contradiction identified in Khrennikov
et al. [32], we were tempted to investigate whether in our
generalized quantum-like theory the contradiction would vanish,
and response replicability would be jointly modelizable with
question order effects. And indeed, we could obtain a positive
result with respect to this issue [34], which we will now sketch
in the next section.
5. BEYOND-QUANTUM MODELS
We presented in Section 4 two paradigmatic situations in human
cognition that cannot be modeled together using the standard
quantum formalism. We want now to explain how the latter
can be naturally extended to also deal with these situations, still
remaining in the ambit of a unitary and coherent framework for
cognitive processes.
For this, we introduce a formalism where the probabilistic
response with respect to a specific experimental situation, i.e.,
a state of the conceptual entity under consideration, can vary,
and hence can be different than the one compatible with the
Born rule of standard quantum theory. This formalism, called
the “extended Bloch representation” of quantum mechanics
[35], exploits in its most recent formulation the fact that
the states of a quantum entity (described as ray-states or
density matrix-states) can be uniquely mapped into a convex
portion of a generalized unit Bloch sphere, in which also
measurements can be represented in a natural way, by means of
appropriate simplexes having the eigenstates as vertex vectors.
A measurement can then be described as a process during
which an abstract point particle (representing the initial state of
the quantum entity) enters into contact with the measurement
simplex, which then, as if it was an elastic and disintegrable
hyper-membrane, can collapse to one of its vertex points
(representing the outcomes states) or to a point of one of its
sub-simplexes (in case the measurement would be degenerate).
We do not enter here into the details of this remarkable
process, and refer the reader to the detailed descriptions in Aerts
and Sassoli de Bianchi [34–37]. For our present purposes, it will
be sufficient to observe that a measurement simplex, considered
as an abstract membrane that can collapse as a result of some
uncontrollable environmental fluctuations, can precisely model
that aspect of a measurement that in the quantum jargon is
called “wave function collapse.”More precisely, when the abstract
point particle enters into contact with the “potentiality region”
represented by such membrane, it creates some “tension lines”
partitioning the latter into different subregions, one for each
possible outcome. The collapse of the membrane toward one of
the vertex points (see Figure 1) then depends on which subregion
disintegrates first, so that the different outcome probabilities
can be expressed as the relative Lebesgue measures of these
subregions (the larger a subregion, the higher the associated
probability). In other terms, this membrane’s mechanism, with
the tension lines generated by the abstract point particle, is a
mathematical representation of a sort of “weighted symmetry
breaking” process. Now, thanks to the remarkable geometry of
simplexes, it can be proven that if the membrane is chosen to
be uniform, thus having the same probability of disintegrating in
any of its points (describing the different possible measurement-
interactions), the collapse probabilities are exactly given by the
Born rule. In other terms, the latter can be derived, and explained,
as being the result of a process of actualization of potential
hidden-measurement interactions, so that the extended Bloch
representation constitutes a possible solution to themeasurement
problem.
Thus, when the membrane is uniform, the “way of
choosing” an outcome is precisely the “Born way.” However,
a uniform membrane is a very special situation, and it is
natural to also consider membranes whose points do not all
have the same probability of disintegrating, i.e., membranes
whose disintegrative processes are described by non-uniform
probability densities ρ, which we simply call ρ-membranes.
Non-uniform ρ-membranes can produce outcome probabilities
different from the standard quantum ones and give rise to
probability models different from the Hilbertian one (even
though the state space is a generalized Bloch sphere derived from
the Hilbert space geometry2). But this is exactly what one needs
in order to account, in a unified framework, for the situation
we encounter when combining the phenomena of “response
replicability” and “question order effects,” as previously described
and analyzed in Khrennikov et al. [32].
We thus see that it is possible to naturally complete the
quantum formalism to obtain a finer grained description of
psychological experiments in which the probabilistic response
of a measurement with respect to a state can be different
to the one described by the Born rule. Additionally, our
generalized quantum-like theory also explains why, despite the
fact that individual measurements are possibly associated with
different non-Born probabilities, the Born rule nevertheless
appears to be a very good approximation to describe numerous
experimental situations. This is related to the notion of “universal
measurement,” firstly introduced by one of us in Aerts [38] and
further analyzed in Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi [35–37, 68]. In
a nutshell, a universal measurement is a measurement whose
2More general state spaces can also be considered, in what has been called the
“general tension-reduction” (GTR) model [36, 37, 40].
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FIGURE 1 | A 2-dimensional measurement simplex, considered as an abstract membrane stretched between the three vertex points x1, a x2, and x3,
with the abstract point particle attached to it, at point x, giving rise to three disjoint convex regions A1, A2, and A3. The vector λ, here assumed to belong
to region A2, indicates the initial point of disintegration of the membrane, which by collapsing brings the point particle to point x2, corresponding to the final outcome
of the measurement.
probabilities are obtained by averaging over the probabilities of
all possible quantum-like measurements sharing a same set of
outcomes, in a same state space. In other terms, a universal
measurement corresponds to an average over all possible non-
uniform ρ-membranes, associated with a given measurement
simplex. Following a strategy similar to that used in the definition
of the “Wiener measure,” it is then possible to show that if the
state space is Hilbertian (more precisely, a convex set of states
inscribed in a generalized Bloch sphere, inherited from a Hilbert
space), then the probabilities of a universal measurement are
precisely those predicted by the Born rule.
In Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi [34] we could show that the
joint situation of question order effects and response replicability
for the data collected with respect to the Gore/Clinton
measurements, and others, is modelizable within our generalized
quantum theory by introducing non-Born type measurements.
However, we were also able to provide a better modeling of
the question order effects data as such. Indeed, using standard
Born-probability quantum theory it was only possible to model
approximately these data in earlier studies [67]. This is due to
the existence of a general algebraic equality about sequential
measurements in Hilbert space quantum theory which is the
following [34, 67, 69]:
Q ≡ MGMCMG −MCMGMC + M¯GM¯CM¯G
−M¯CM¯GM¯C = 0 (3)
where {MG, M¯G = 1 − MG} and {MC, M¯C = 1 − MC} are the
spectral families associated with the Hilbert model of the Gore
and Clinton measurements introduced in Section 4. Taking the
average q = 〈H|Q|H〉, one thus obtains, more specifically:
q ≡ µGyCy(H)− µCyGy(H)+ µGnCn(H)− µCnGn(H) = 0. (4)
This equality has been called the “QQ-equality,” and can be used
as a test for the quantumness of the probability model, but only
in the sense that a quantum model, necessarily, has to obey it,
although the fact that it does so is not a guarantee that the model
will be Hilbertian. Inserting the experimental values Equations
(1) and (2) into Equation (4), one finds q = 0.0032 6= 0. This
value is small (being only 0.32% of the maximum value q can
take, which is 1), which is the reason that approximate modeling
can be obtained within Hilbert space quantum theory [67]. Note
however that Equation(3) does not depend on the dimension
of the Hilbert space considered, which means that even in
higher dimensional Hilbert spaces, if degenerate measurements
are considered, an exact modeling would still be impossible to
obtain. We have reasons to believe that also question order
effects, with the QQ-equality standing in the way of an exact
modeling of the data, contain an indication for the need to turn
to a more general quantum-like theory, such as the one we used
to cope with the joint phenomenon of question order effects and
response replicability. We present some arguments in this regard
in the following of this section.
First, we note that in case one chooses a two-dimensional
Hilbert space, additional equalities can be written which are
strongly violated by the data this time. As an example, consider
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the quantity [34]:
q′ ≡ µCyGn(H)µCnGn(H)− µCnGy(H)µCyGy(H) (5)
= 〈H|MCM¯GMC|H〉〈H|M¯CM¯GM¯C|H〉
−〈H|M¯CMGM¯C|H〉〈H|MCMGMC|H〉 (6)
If the Hilbert space is two-dimensional, one can write MG =
|G〉〈G|, M¯G = |G¯〉〈G¯|, as well as MC = |C〉〈C|, M¯C =
|C¯〉〈C¯|. Replacing these expressions into Equation (6) one finds,
after some easy algebra, that q′ = 0. However, inserting the
experimental values Equations (1) and (2) into Equation (6), one
finds q′ = −0.073 6= 0, which not only is not zero, but also 29.2%
of the maximum value that q′ can take (which is 0.25).
Second, let us repeat our intuitive reasoning as to why
measurements in the situation of response replicability carry
non-Bornian probabilities. Due to the local contexts of the
collection of sequential measurements, Gore, Clinton, and then
Gore again, the thirdmeasurement internally changes into a non-
Bornian one, and more specifically a deterministic one for the
considered state, since response replicability means that for all
subsequent Gore measurements the same outcome is assured. It
might well be the case, although an intuitive argument would
be more complex to give in this case, that also for the situation
of question order effects, precisely because they only appear if
a same human mind is sequentially interrogated, non-Bornian
probabilities would be required. An even stronger hypothesis,
which we plan to investigate in the future, is that most individual
human minds, and perhaps even all, would carry in general
non-Bornian probabilities, so that the success of Hilbert space
quantum theory and Bornian probabilities would be mainly
an effect of averaging over a sufficiently large set of different
human minds, which effectively is what happens in a standard
psychological experiment. If this last hypothesis is true, the
violation of the Born rule for question order effects and response
replicability would be quite natural, since the same human
mind is needed to provoke these effects. Indeed, our analysis
in Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi [36, 37] shows that standard
quantum probabilities in the modeling of human cognition can
be explained by considering that in numerous experimental
situations the average over the different participants will be quite
close to that of a universal measurement, which as we observed
is exactly given by the Born rule. In other terms, even if the
probability model of an individual psychological measurement
could be non-Hilbertian, it will generally admit a first order
approximation, and when the states of the conceptual entity
under investigation can be described by means of a Hilbert space
structure, this first order approximation will precisely correspond
to the quantum mechanical Born rule.
If the above considerations provide an interesting piece of
explanation as to why the Born rule is generally successful
also beyond the micro-physical domain, at the same time it
also contains a plausible reason of why it will possibly be not
successful in all experimental situations, i.e., when the average is
either not large enough, or when the experiment is so conceived
that it doesn’t apply as such. This could be the typical situation
of question order effects and response replicability, since in this
case we do not consider an average over singlemeasurements, but
over sequential (conditional) measurements. And this could be
an explanation of whyHilbertian symmetries like those described
above can be easily violated and that it will not be possible, by
means of the Born rule, to always obtain an exact fit of the data
[34, 40].
Additionally, as we said, it allowed us to precisely fit the
data by using the extended Bloch representation, and more
specifically simple one-dimensional locally uniform membranes
inscribed in a 3-dimensional Bloch sphere that can disintegrate
(i.e., break) only inside a connected internal region [34]. Thanks
to this modeling, we could also understand that the reason the
Clinton/Gore and similar data appear to almost obey the QQ-
equality (Equation 4) is quite different from the reason the
equality is obeyed by pure quantum probabilities. Indeed, in a
pure quantum model two specific contributions to the q-value
(Equation 4), called the “relative indeterminism” and “relative
asymmetry” contributions, are necessarily both identically zero,
whereas we could show, using our extended model, that for the
data (Equation 2), and similar data, these two contributions are
both very different from zero, but happen to almost cancel each
other, thus explaining why the q = 0 equality is almost obeyed,
although the probabilities are manifestly non-Bornian [34].
6. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this article we explained the essence of the operational-
realistic approach to cognition developed in Brussels, which in
turn originated from the foundational approach to quantum
physics elaborated initially in Geneva and then in Brussels (in
what has become known as the “Geneva-Brussels school”). Our
emphasis was that this approach is sufficiently general, and
fundamental, to provide a unitary framework that can be used to
coherently describe, and realistically interpret, not only quantum
theory, but also its natural extensions, like the extended Bloch
model and the GTR-model. In this final section we offer some
additional comments on our approach to cognition, taking into
consideration the confusion that sometimes exists between “ad
hoc (phenomenological) models’ and “theoretical (first principle)
models,” as well as the critique that a Hilbertian model (and a
fortiori its possible extensions) is suspicious because it allows
“too many free parameters’ to obtain an exact fit (and not just
an approximate fit) for all the experimental data.
In that respect, it is worth emphasizing that the principal focus
of our “theory of human cognition” is not to model as precisely
as possible the data gathered in psychological measurements. A
faithful modeling of the data is of course an essential part of
it, but our aim is actually more ambitious. In putting forward
our methodology, consisting in looking at instances of decision-
making as resulting from an interaction of a decision-maker
with a conceptual entity, we look first of all for a theory
truly describing “the reality of the cognitive realm to which a
conceptual entity belongs,” and additionally also “how human
minds can interact with the latter so that decision-making can
occur.”
In this sense, each time we have put forward a model for some
specific experimental data, it has always been our preoccupation
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to also make sure that (i) the model was extracted following
the logic that governs our theory of human cognition, and
(ii) that whatever other experiments would be performed by a
human mind interacting with that same cognitive-conceptual
entity under consideration, also the data of these hypothetical
additional experiments could have been modeled exactly in
the same way. Clearly, this requirement—that “all possible
experiments and data” have to be modeled in an equivalent
way—poses severe constraints to our approach, and it is not
a priori evident that this would always be possible. However,
we are convinced that the fundamental idea underlying our
methodology, namely that of looking upon a decision as an
interaction of a humanmind with a conceptual entity in a specific
state (with such state being independent of the human minds
possibly interacting with it), equips the theory of exactly those
degrees of freedom that are needed to model “all possible data
from all possible experiments.”
As we already explained in the foregoing, in all this we have
been guided by how physical theories deal with data coming
from the physical domain. They indeed satisfy this criterion and
are able to model all data from all possible experiments that
can be executed on a given physical entity. What we have called
“conceptual entity” is what in physics corresponds to the notion
of “physical entity.” Now, in our approach we might be classified
as adhering to an idealistic philosophy, i.e., believing that the
conceptual entities “really exist,” and are not mere creations of
our human culture. Our answer to this objection is the following:
to profit of the strength of the approach it is not mandatory
to take a philosophical stance in the above mentioned way, in
the sense that we are not obliged to attribute more existence
to what we call a conceptual entity than that attributed, for
example, to “human culture” in its entirety. The importance
of the approach lies in considering such a conceptual entity as
independently existing from any interaction with a human mind,
and describe the continuously existing interactions with human
minds as processes of the “change of state of the conceptual
entity,” and whenever applicable also as processes of the “change
of context.” And again, let us emphasize that this “hidden-
interaction” methodology is inspired by its relevance to physical
theories. Our working hypothesis is that in this way it will be
possible to advantageously model, and better understand, all of
human cognition experimental situations.
Having said this, we observe that the interpretation of the
quantum formalism that is commonly used in cognitive domains
is a subjectivist one, very similar to that interpretation of
quantum theory known as “quantum Bayesianism,” or “QBism”
[70]. In a sense, this interpretation is the polar opposite of
our realistic (non-subjectivistic) operational approach. Indeed,
QBism originates from a strong critique [71] of the famous
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen reality criterion [72], whereas at the
foundation of the Geneva-Brussels approach there is the idea
of taking such criterion not only extremely seriously, but also
of using it more thoroughly, as a powerful demarcating tool
separating “actually existing properties” from “properties that are
only available to be brought into actual existence,” and therefore
exist in a potential sense [73]. In other terms, a quantum state is
not considered in QBism as a description of the actual properties
of a physical entity, but of the beliefs of the experimenter
about it. Similarly, for the majority of authors in quantum
cognition, a quantum state is a description of the state of belief
of a participant, and not of the actual state of the conceptual
entity that interacts with the participants. In ultimate analysis,
this difference of perspectives is about taking a clear position
regarding the key notion of “certainty”: is certainty (probability 1
assignments) just telling us something about the very firm belief
of a subject, or also about some objective properties of the world
(be it physical or cultural)? In the same way, are probabilities only
shared personal beliefs, based on habit, or also elements of reality
(considering that in principle their values can be predicted with
certainty)? Although we certainly agree that it is not necessary
to take a final stance on these issues to advantageously exploit
the quantummathematics in the modeling of many experimental
situations, both in physics and cognition, we also think that the
explicative power of a pure subjectivist view rapidly diminishes
when we have to address the most remarkable properties of
the physical and conceptual entities, like non-locality (non-
spatiality) and the non-compositional way with which they can
combine.
It is important to emphasize that the subjectivist view is also
a consequence of the absence, in the usual quantum formalism,
of a meaningful description of what goes on “behind the
scenes” during a measurement. On the other hand, the hidden-
measurement paradigm, as implemented in the extended Bloch
representation [35], or even more generally in the GTR-model
[36, 37, 40], offers a credible description of the dynamics of a
measurement process, in terms of a process of actualization of
potential interactions, thus explaining a possible origin of the
quantum indeterminism. This certainly allows understanding
the so-called “collapse of the state vector” as an objective
process, either produced by a macroscopic apparatus in a physics
laboratory, or by a mind-brain apparatus in a psychological
laboratory. As we tried to motivate in the second part of
this article, this completed version of the quantum formalism
also allowed us to describe those aspects of a psychological
measurements—the possible different ways participants can
choose an outcome—that would be impossible to model by
remaining within the narrow confines, not only of the quantum
formalism, but also of a strict subjectivistic interpretation
of it.
To conclude, a final remark is in order. Quantum cognition is
undoubtedly a fascinating field of investigation also for physicists,
as it offers the opportunity to take a new look at certain
aspects of the quantum formalism and use them to possibly
make discoveries also in the physical domain. We already
mentioned the example of “entangled measurements,” that were
necessary to exactly model certain correlations. Entangled (non-
separable) measurements are usually not considered in the
physics of Bell inequalities, while they are widely explored in
quantum cryptography, teleportation and information. However,
it is very possible that this stronger form of entanglement
will prove to be useful for the interpretation of certain non-
locality tests and the explanation of “anomalies” that were
identified in EPR-Bell experiments [44]. Also, for what concerns
the notion of “universal measurement,” which is quite natural
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in psychological measurements, since data are obtained from
a collection of different minds, could it be that “universal
averages” also happen in the physical domain? In other terms,
could it be that a single measurement apparatus is actually
more like “a collection of different minds” than “a single
Born-like mind”? Considering that the origin of the observed
deviations from the Born rule, in situations of sequential
measurements, can be understood as the ineffectiveness of
the averaging process in producing the Born prescription,
is it possible to imagine, in the physics laboratory, similar
experimental situations where these deviations would be
equally observed, thus confirming that the hypothesis of
“hidden measurement-interactions” would be a pertinent one
also beyond the psychological domain? Whatever the verdict
will be, we certainly live in a very stimulating time for
foundational research; a time where the conceptual tools
that once helped us building a deeper understanding of the
“microscopic layer” of our physical reality are now proving
to be instrumental for understanding our human “mental
layer”; but also a time where all this is also coming back to
physics, not only in the form of possible new experimental
findings, but also of possible new and deeper understandings
[74, 75].
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